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At the present stage of social develop-
ment in Europe and Russia, studies analy-
zing and evaluating ethnic and national 
borders are of increasing relevance. Over 
the last three decades, the state borders in 
the Baltic region have been stable, which is 
not the case in Europe in general. The 
author believes that the key reason behind 
the current crisis in Russia-EU relations is 
the conspicuous neglect of Russian inte-
rests in the neighboring countries that for-
med after the disintegration of the USSR. 
However, escalation of the conflict was his-
torically and geographically predetermi-
ned. The political borders of post-Soviet 
states do not coincide with the ethnic ones 
and, therefore, the attempts to consolidate 
states through ethnic mobilization meet 
corresponding resistance from groups with 
a different identity. In the Baltic region, 
these processes have not reached the Uk-
rainian scale; however, there are prerequi-
sites for ethno-political conflicts of this 
type. The post-Crimean political debate in 
the Baltic states has shown that that hardli-
ners of a strict assimilation model of state 
identity prevail in Vilnius, Riga, and Tallinn. 
This study sets out to analyze the politi-
cal consequences of the conflict between 
the existing models of ethnopolitical identi-
fication in the border areas of the Eastern 
Baltic region. The main result of the study 
is that it has proved the existence of a spe-
cial type of identity characteristic of border 
regions of the Baltic countries. In the con-
text of this identity, the classic postmoder-
nist dilemma of “us and them” is insuffi-
cient for a proper scientific analysis, and 
even more so for a political forecast. The 
formation of a special “double” or “transi-
tional” identity in the border areas can ser-
ve both as a tool for strengthening of states 
and intergovernmental relations and as a 
ground for large-scale conflicts with hardly 
predictable consequences. 
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The state border issues cannot remain on the fringes of public policy 
simply because a border is a mandatory feature of any state. Both global and 
European research carried out by geographers and historians, ethnographers 
and internationalists have drawn a lot of attention to these issues. In the 20th 
century studying border-related issues became particularly popular. This 
interest was fuelled by four principal disputes/events. We would like to note 
that three of them are directly related to the Baltic region: 
1. Postwar borders (World War I). 
2. Postwar borders (World War II). 
3. Collapse of the colonial system. 
4. Collapse of the socialist bloc and the USSR. 
The problem of dichotomy of the state and ethnic boundaries was most 
actively discussed within the framework of the territorial and political 
delimitation resulting from the two world wars. In the wake of the First 
World War in the Baltics, some border-lines were drawn with no account for 
the ethnic factor. This was true of the German-Polish, Polish-Lithuanian, 
Latvian-Soviet and Estonian-Soviet borders. It is characteristic that all they 
were a source of instability, wars and underwent radical revision after the 
Second World War. They were adjusted in accordance with the ethnic factor. 
New German-Polish and Polish-Soviet borders were drawn taking into 
account the strategic and ethnic considerations. If the strategic factors were 
in conflict with ethnic boundaries, these were the ethnic boundaries that got 
adjusted, by such methods as deportation, among others. Political and legal 
assessment of some related events is subject to contoroversy but, typically, 
the new boundaries would be based on the coincidence of ethnic and 
political lines that were both stable and rooted in the political and economic 
systems in which they were created. 
We would like to note that in the USSR, the research on boundaries was 
extremely limited. The study of boundaries in the Soviet Union was seen as 
‘a bourgeois pseudoscience and geopolitics’. A small monograph by an 
ethnographer and a small-circulation collection written by geographers from 
the Moscow State University became practically the only available volumes 
on the issue; both became a rarity immediately after the publication [1; 2]. 
Of course, after 1991, the situation started changing rapidly, and the number 
of papers dedicated to limnological issues began to grow rapidly. Before we 
review current theories, we should admit that the long isolation of the Soviet 
science led to the fact that after 1991, the Russian scientific school was 
unable to offer any original theoretical insights, and focused more on the 
study of specific borders and regulations on the access to border areas. 
Let us consider the foreign policy aspect of the problem posed in the title 
of the article. The stability, status and type of boundaries depend on the ge-
neral nature of relationship between the states or shared public associations. 
In 1999, one of the leading Russian experts in the field, A. Makarychev 
wrote, ‘Russia has established its new attitude toward the West from the geo-
political point of view pretty quickly but the West remains in the intellectual 
confusion and has no constructive ideas to be guided by in the policies to-
wards Russia’ [3, p. 3]. Time was lost; Russian perception of European 
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policy changed and expectations gave way to disappointment. As a result, in 
15 years, having overcome the ‘intellectual confusion’ and promoting the 
‘Eastern Partnership’, the collective ‘West’ confronted a tough response 
from the Russian government. The statements made over the past 20 years 
emphasising our priority interests in the CIS countries and the protection of 
compatriots evolved into a real policy. 
The political processes, which have rapidly unfolded since the autumn of 
2013 in the former Soviet Union, or, more precisely, in the Ukraine, helped 
raise a number of complicated issues that require explanation of the situa-
tion. In the Baltic Sea Region (including the Baltic States, Poland, Finland 
and Germany), a massive debate over the genesis, forms, methods and pros-
pects of the Russian foreign policy was initiated. One of the key elements of 
the discussion was a new insight into border issues in Eastern Europe and 
Russia in particular. We should note that many of the issues discussed 
among the colleagues have long ceased to be new for Russian scientific and 
expert community, although they are still relevant. 
Consideration of the Russian Federation borders within the currently 
existing borders shows remarkable continuity on the boundaries. The Rus-
sian state has existed in these lines since as early as the end of the 16th — 
beginning of the 17th century. The fact that Russian current borders (es-
pecially in the European part of Russia) are almost identical to those of the 
Russian kingdom 400 years ago is very significant. Of course, the full com-
parison of the geopolitical position of Russia in the late 20th century and 
Russia in the 16th/17th centuries is questionable primarily because the bor-
der is not the only factor that determines the state’s geopolitical characteri-
stics. Nevertheless, the main geopolitical factors influencing the policy of 
Russia in the Baltic region in the 16th/18th centuries were as follows: 
1. Russia’s lack of reliable access to the Baltic Sea and as a consequence, 
the lack of either military or commercial fleet, and limited foreign trade op-
portunities. 
2. A considerable number of Russians and Orthodox Christians living in 
the countries adjacent to Russia, who have been subjected to national, cultu-
ral, linguistic and legal discrimination by the states where they lived. Natu-
rally, politically this population leans towards Moscow. 
Thus, Russia and her president, Vladimir Putin, faced the dichotomy of 
the ethnic and national boundaries similar to that experienced under Peter the 
Great. However, the borders near Belgorod, Bryansk and Ivangorod lead to 
logical questions as to why both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, 
having established all the prerequisites for the creation of six national states 
in Eastern Europe, collapsed leaving a large part of the population iden-
tifying themselves as ‘Russians’ outside the Russian border. As S. V. Kortu-
nov notes, ‘You can not equate the Soviet Union as a state and the country 
which has historically been Russia’ [4, p. 11]. The USSR collapsed but his-
torical Russia persevered, and not always the official boundaries of Russia 
coincided with the boundaries of the so-called “Russian World”. In the Bal-
tic Sea Region this problem has also existed although obviously is not as 
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acute as in the Ukraine. We would also like to note that, despite the massive 
forced displacement of the population, the ethnic and political boundaries of 
the “Polish World” do not match either, for example. 
The recent developments in Ukraine have clearly shown that in the states 
that have not been subject to any adequate political and economic moderni-
sation, the geography of boundaries can go from the theoretical level to a 
practical one. This requires certain conditions. An inefficient state is one of 
the reasons; no less important is the history of boundaries, ethnic and ethno-
cultural composition of the population — especially in border areas. 
The key issue related to the state borders of Russia in general and Russia 
in the Baltics is the duality and inconsistency of the ethno-cultural and 
territorial-political identification. That is why the events in Ukraine are so 
carefully monitored by Latvia (the Latgale problem), Estonia (North-East) 
and Lithuania (the Vilnius district). ‘In the border areas the category 
‘identity’ appears in several interrelated perspectives: first, the identity as 
boundary (the boundary between identities in the geographical space), and 
secondly, as the mutual impact from formal boundaries (primarily the state 
ones) and identities’ [5, p. 131]. 
These processes, as rightly pointed by K. Segbers are quite clearly geo-
graphically referenced: ‘In Eastern Europe, where since 1989 a nation buil-
ding process had taken place, and new states used to come out, their role see-
med to be increasing. But in fact, since the 1990’s it (the nation building 
practice — N. M.) has been structurally and essentially weakened’ [6, p. 69]. 
The significance of research into the dichotomy of the ethnic and natio-
nal boundaries lies in the large-scale revision of European borders in the 
post-Stalin period. It should be remembered that the ‘two world wars have 
very much changed the map outline for different countries. 54.2 % of the 
borders in Western Europe were established after 1910; 24.3 % are dated 
l910—1924, and 29.9 % occurred after World War II’ [7, p.11]. These figu-
res refer to the “anxious” year of 1989. Today, given the collapse of the So-
viet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, these figures have grown. ‘Glo-
balisation has eroded the ‘Westphalian cartography’ along with clear 
dividing lines between the area’ [8, p. 483—484]. Border as a boundary and 
barrier gradually evolved towards the development of a contact function, but 
it was taking place in difficult conditions: ‘... the collapse of the Soviet 
bloc... the break-up of the Soviet Union... again put Europe in the focus of 
conflicts and tensions’ [9, p. 25]. These lines, written 22 years ago, are a 
testament to the fact that the current problems were predicted in a timely 
manner — but they were not heard. The crisis and destruction of Yugoslavia, 
Moldova and Georgia did not receive any adequate conceptualisation in 
research. For example, in 1990 Joseph Camilleri pointed to the theoretical 
component of the emerging problems: ‘We live in a period of transition to a 
new form of civil society, in which there are no clearly defined boundaries, 
based on the principle of national identity’ [10, p. 35]. 
It is difficult to argue with this formula but it is not clear why military 
conflicts arise and boundaries are revised in the context of identity transit. 
The thing is that the struggle for national borders, while remaining at the 
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forefront of global politics, is not the only political opposition ‘front’ bet-
ween countries. Now there is a fight at the ‘second front’ without any not 
clearly determined boundaries, and the processes of ethnic and cultural iden-
tification, self-identification and reidentification are being steadily politi-
cised. As noted by V. Tishkov, ‘identity is not only the ever-changing con-
cept that there is a group; that is always a fight for control of the 
representation, definition, for what constitutes the group’s main features and 
values. And the fight is not only a political one. It is in the field of science 
and religion, the language relations, symbols, historical and territorial ideas 
etc.’ [11, p. 37]. 
The phenomenon is understood in Vilnius, Riga and Tallinn. From the 
point of view of the Baltic political elite the ethnic form of social identity is 
the most important for the development of national identity, which in this 
case becomes a national identity. However, the imposition of the nation-state 
identity encountered stubborn resistance from non-titular nations. That has 
actually resulted in assimilation under the guise of integration and patrio-
tism, which is why the issue has received so much attention. Fighting against 
the Russian language in this context is quite logical as the current national 
identity is based on language as its key formal characteristic. Religious 
identity gives less opportunity for the nation-state identification. In the case 
of Lithuania and the Polish minority, this factor does not work at all. In 
Estonia and Latvia the religious identity factor historically has never been a 
high priority. However, the persecution of the Orthodox Church of the Mos-
cow Patriarchate in Estonia shows the ruling elites’ attention to this factor of 
creation of a national identity as well. 
The national identity lays the foundation for modern territorial and po-
litical education burdened with a lot of historical ‘memory complexes’. It is 
formed by the interaction of elements of two types: 
1) the original elements of the political and cultural matrix (national 
mentality, stereotypes, archaic forms of identification, unconscious elements 
of social beliefs of an individual about his own group membership etc.); 
2) the state coercion, i. e. the ability of the state to influence the proces-
ses of identification through the use of ideological, economic and political 
measures. 
At present, along with the official boundaries, there appear some fuzzy 
and/or shifting boundaries, which are formed in different ways in different 
strata of society. In particular, we can talk about the so-called “boundaries of 
identity”. The state border of Russia is not homogeneous, it can manifest as: 
— a limitation on the territorial ‘security space’ (boundaries); 
— a transition line to the adjacent territory (borders); 
— a peripheral line (margins); 
— a line of contact with neighbours (frontiers); 
— an area which has its own specificity generated under the influence of 
close cooperation with its neighbours and multiculturalism (borderlands) 
[12, p. 3—4; 13, p. 15]. 
Russian borders in the Baltic region serve all of these purposes. A com-
bination of factors — including shared history, modern security systems and 
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economic cooperation in the region — account for a somewhat post-modern 
character of borders with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The Russian-Polish 
border, which was created as a barrier, is rapidly developing its contact 
functions associated with the so-called ‘simplified mode’. It should be added 
that, with the Russian-Polish border, the impact of the contact on the speed 
of “contact zone” development is quite significant. Without the ‘simplified 
mode’, as it is in the case of Russian-Finnish border, only decades of the 
cross-border relations could provide such an effect, i. e. the transformation of 
the type of contact with neighbours in the area, which has its own special 
characteristics acquired under the influence of multiculturalism and close 
cooperation with the neighboring regions. When one is considering the rea-
sons for this phenomenon, it is easy to assume that the resulting multi-status 
nature of the boundary is strictly dependent on the general climate of bilate-
ral relations. 
However, the historical component is also important, especially in cases 
where the new state borders conincide with the old administrative bounda-
ries. According to Michael Emerson, Russia is the ‘reluctant ex-empire’ that 
has lost most of its influence in the former Soviet Union, but still remains a 
strong centre, while the EU is the ‘reluctant empire’, which is gradually 
growing though further European expansion. Since these two empires exist 
in the same geographical and political context, the interaction between them 
is inevitable. If there is a centre, then there will be peripheries. The problem 
in the case of Russia and the European Union consists precisely in the fact 
that the peripheries partly overlap. In accordance with the Emerson’s grada-
tion, the ‘regions of border Europe’ are divided as follows [14]: 
 Clean-cut periphery (i. e. the areas where there is a ‘watershed’ bet-
ween the two ‘empires’, and there is no uncertainty about the status of an 
area). Probably all the legal (Lithuania, Latvia) and actual (Estonia) borders 
with the Baltic states can be attributed to this type today. 
 Integrated periphery (i. e. the states that seek to integrate with one of 
the two ‘empires’). Until 2004, those were the Baltic States. 
 Divided periphery (i. e. the states that maintain communications with 
both ‘empires’). In the Baltics, there are no examples, and that is certainly 
Ukraine on the western border of Russia. 
 Overlapping peripheries (i. e. the entities where communities identify 
themselves as part of one of the ‘empires’, are located on the periphery in the 
other ‘empire’). That is the north-eastern part of Estonia, a part of Latgale. 
Which concepts may help explaining the situation there? A number of 
questions in the identity cross-border research theory have been 
comprehensively analysed by V. Popkov, so we will only mention those fac-
tors that have not been considered in his seminal work on the subject [15]. 
We agree with the position of V. Popkov on the role of the ‘cataclysm dias-
pora’ theory [16] and with his idea that it is best to study it within the new 
borders of the former Soviet Union. The existing approaches and concepts of 
‘transmigration’ have limited application as far as the dichotomy of the state 
and national borders goes [17]. 
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Some additional features are mentioned in the works of scholars who 
prefer transnatsionalist approach to international relations, where internatio-
nal relations are understood as ‘all interactions between the state-based 
entities across the state boundaries [18, p. 284]. Transnationalism explains 
the crisis of internal borders within the EU and in other integrative associa-
tions. Border built as a barrier are the institute that distorts the logic of eco-
nomic and political decision-making in the state. Transnatsionalists therefore 
believe that in terms of the rationality of decisions the states lose non-state 
actors [19]. 
According to the constructivist tradition, cultural, or, more precisely, 
ethnic boundary is determined by the result of internal social construction, 
both individual and group-related. In 1969 F. Barth used the category of 
‘border’ to determine the ethnic group in his book, Ethnic Groups and Boun-
daries: The Social Organisation of Cultural Differences. F. Barth and his co-
authors note that the presence of ethnic groups inevitably involves spatial 
boundaries, since ethnic communities tend to have spatial localisation. In 
this context, we point out an important observation made by Barth in the 
introduction to the volume:‘boundary maintenance is unproblematical and 
follows from the isolation which the itemized characteristics imply: racial 
difference, cultural difference, social separation and language barriers, 
spontaneous and organized enmity’ [20, p. 11]. Thus, in accordance with the 
classical approach of F. Barth, ethnic boundaries reflect the outcomes of 
internal social construction or organisation of cultural and psychological 
differences in the interaction of a given ethnic group with other groups. 
Indeed, if the boundaries set the differences between ethnic communities, 
then the gradient of the differences would be greater, since each side might 
identify itself as a bearer of fundamentally different values and symbolic 
meanings and images [21]. 
Postmodernism as a research strategy draws special attention to borders, 
both symbolic and real. With regard to the study of borders, one of the most 
important theoretical inputs of postmodernism is the study of border 
transformation. Postmodern approach has some limitations, particularly in its 
focus on informal borders to the point of disregard of formal boundaries, so 
one can only partially agree with the mission statement of postmodernists, 
‘A distinctive feature of a border zone is the transcultural nature and 
presence in the cultural space of many others, the presence of a variety of 
borders and the forced border crossing practices’ [22]. While this cannot be 
true of all cases, in the Baltic Sea area, and, more specifically, in the eastern 
part of the Baltics, this approach is quite applicable. 
The way cultural identity is practiced in the border areas is not only an 
admission, but a sign of complete awareness of the boundaries of a cultural 
and political phenomenon, its norms and practices. Sometimes, however, a 
boundary is used as a multi-purpose marker of cultures. That is the way the 
Russian-Chinese border used to look like in the past. Such a boundary is 
transformed into a ‘milestone’, a multi-faceted ‘limit’. Because this border 
exists, it is possible to identify culture around it. 
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The question then arises, what happens if similar, rather than different, 
ethnic and cultural groups are separated by a boundary? In other words, what 
happens to the cross-border ethnic identities on the borders between 
Ivangorod and Narva, Braslaw and Daugavpils, Pskov, Pechora and Tallinn? 
In cases like these, cultural and ethnic markers are close [23]. Moreover, it 
looks as if an ethnic identity was shaped regardless — and often in spite of 
the border. 
This thesis is particularly relevant in the Baltic region, where the issues 
of boundary stability have been recently revised. Yet in Europe as a whole, 
this issue is addressed even more rigorously. National regionalism of the 
new Europe implies a possibility (but not a necessity) of several alternatives 
of regional ethno-political identity for each community. For the Baltic Sea 
region, it is still unclear whether we are looking at an auxiliary identity 
based on two ‘reference cultures’ or at one reference culture and an auxiliary 
one (as is the case with the border areas in the North-East Estonia and Dau-
gavpils, for example). 
It should also be noted that the categories of “Self” (friend), “Alien” 
(foe), or “the Other” so frequently mentioned in the post-modern discourse 
cannot fully and comprehensively meet the objectives of the identity studies 
for border areas. In the Baltic region, either mixed or transitional identity 
models are created in some cases. 
Let us consider the situation in the city of Narva, Estonia. Can we really 
describe people who live there in these terms? They speak Russian at home 
and Estonian at work. They have a Russian passport and an Estonian ID 
card. With their Russian passport they can go to Vladivostok, with their 
Estonian ID — to Lisbon. They have two SIM cards — one for a Russian 
network, one for Estonian. They did not have to serve in the Russian army, 
because they have lived in Estonia all their life. They did not have to serve in 
the Estonian army, either, because they have a Russian passport, and with it — 
a Russian citizenship. They work in Narva, at the border, and their firm’s 
headquarters are in Tallinn. Their partner’s business is based in St. Peters-
burg. They do not care for either Protestant or Orthodox denominations. And 
so the question remains — how do we classify this person in relation to 
either Russian or Estonian culture? We may not know the answer yet, but, 
unfortunately, both Moscow and Tallinn have long chosen to regard such 
people as “foes”. Now, given the rising tensions between Tallinn and Mos-
cow, the issue is growing hotter and hotter. 
Summing up, we should note that the political visionaties of the 19th cen-
tury were already talking about expanding the boundaries of the state in the 
context of the unified boundaries of ethnic identification (self-identification) 
and the state borders. 
In 1872, Otto von Bismarck, who was familiar with both Russia and its 
Baltic provinces, was quoted as saying, ‘I would not accept the Baltics even 
if Russia presented it to me as a gift’. Unlike his successors, this German 
Chancellor was well aware of the fact that economic and political control 
over the territory was not enough to ensure its full integration into the 
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German Reich, i. e. into the ‘German World’. Such an approach means that 
attempts to execute territorial and political control by force while ignoring 
established territorial identities cannot be successful in the long run. 
On the other hand, the experience of the Baltic region shows that an 
unbalanced national policy creates potential threats and a possibility of a 
revision of national borders. 
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